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ABSTRACT
We examine Kindergarten allocation practices in an Estonian municipality,
Harku. Based on our recommendations, the allocation mechanism in Harku
was redesigned in 2016. The new mechanism produces a child-optimal stable
matching, with priorities primarily based on siblings and distance. We evaluate
seven policy designs based on 2016 admission data in order to understand
efficiency and fairness trade-offs. In addition to the descriptive data analysis,
we conduct a counter-factual policy comparison and sensitivity analysis using
computational experiments with generated preferences. We fix the allocation
mechanism to be the child-oriented Deferred-Acceptance algorithm, but we
vary how the priorities are created by altering sibling and distance factors.
Different lotteries are included for breaking ties. We find that different ways
of considering the same priority factors can have a significant aggregate effect
on the allocation. Additionally, we survey a dozen special features that can
create significant challenges (both theoretical and practical) in redesigning the
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allocation mechanism in Estonian Kindergartens, and potentially elsewhere as
well.
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1. INTRODUCTION
F amilies have become a much-debated issue in all developed countriesand they form the focal point of debates about “new risks” and the much
needed “new policies” for Western welfare states. The questions of who should
care for children, to what extent and for how long, lie at the centre of conflicts
about the values that shape not only policies and struggles around policies, but
also individual and family choices (Saraceno, 2011). Moreover, in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet legacy has paved the way for the dominance of publicly
provided care, but in many countries, including the case examined here, there is
a shortage of early childhood care places for children aged 18 months to three
years. This shortage of places has forced municipalities, who are the main
providers, to set priorities for the allocation of these places. Priorities are aimed
not only at solving the problem of oversubscription, but also at implementing
social goals. Thus, we conceptualise the process of implementing priorities
accompanied with allocation principles (matching design) as policy design.
Policy design entails taking the approach of a matching mechanism design
in order to propose a good way to allocate children to Kindergartens. There are
process descriptions about the (re-)design of school choice mechanisms, e.g.
in various cities in the US (Pathak & So¨nmez, 2013; Pathak & Shi, 2013; Ergin
& So¨nmez, 2006) and in Amsterdam (de Haan et al., 2015). Nevertheless, to
the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to report such a redesign of a
Kindergarten place allocation mechanism. However, our theoretical foundation
relies on the mechanism design literature motivated by related applications,
such as school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 2003; Abdulkadirog˘lu et
al., 2005a), college admissions (Biro´ et al., 2010b; S.-H. Chen et al., 2012)
and job assignments (Roth, 2008). Mechanism design provides methods for
allocation under given welfare criteria and selection priorities, but it does not
prescribe the way in which these priorities should be applied. The general
policy considerations for school choice are the allocation of siblings to the
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same school and the proximity of the school. Some countries also use some
affirmative action measures, e.g. prioritising children of low socio-economic
status. Similar principles are applicable to our Kindergarten policy design case
study while aiming for the clear-cut implementation and operationalisation
of policies. The latter not only concerns a clear definition of proximity as
a priority (i.e. defined as a walk-zone (Shi, 2015) or a continuous cardinal
measure (West et al., 2004)) or the ordering of priority classes but also allows
for the implementation of welfare considerations in policy evaluation.
Our welfare considerations aim at two social goals: efficiency and fairness.
We define efficiency as the ability of a policy to meet predefined goals, the
utility of families (high rank in their preferences and siblings in the same
Kindergarten) accompanied with social goals such as minimising the travel
distance or time to Kindergartens. Defining fairness is more problematic and
entails more uncertainty. Our definition of fairness is based on the idea of
equal access. It is operationalised by the probability that the child is assigned
to her first preference.
Our study considers a local municipality Harku, in Estonia. Instead of
implementing certain social goals by policy design, the most commonly used
priority in Estonian municipalities is the date of application, while in limited
cases, catchment areas are applied to ensure proximity. Children are ordered
on the basis of the application date in a manner similar to a serial dictatorship
mechanism, thus forcing one-sided matchings without enabling the imple-
mentation of affirmative action policies or social goals, such as fairness. In
addition, parental preferences are either not considered or have been limited.
In the Harku case, the number of preferences was bounded by three until 2015.
The latter restriction implies that preferences are not revealed truthfully and
moreover, the matching has been done manually.
Between 2014 and 2016, as part of an Estonian project we collaborated with
representatives of the Harku municipality. We monitored their 2015 allocation
practice and suggested a revision which led to a transitory system in 2016.
In the 2016 allocation, the standard student-proposing Deferred-Acceptance
mechanism was used under a special priority setting which is described in
detail in Section 2.2. This mechanism is known to be strategy-proof, and the
parents were encouraged to submit full preference lists, so we can expect the
submitted applications to be truthful. We made a comparative assessment of
policies using the 2016 data. As an input we used preference data collected
from 152 families who have the right to a Kindergarten place.
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 2(1), 2017
“p˙03” — 2018/1/16 — 12:42 — page 60 — #4
60 Kindergarten allocation policy design
In the assessment, we proposed seven different policies which consist of
different metrics of indicating distance (as absolute, relative or binary mea-
sures), siblings, quotas; and their priority order. Ties are broken by assigning
random numbers either with a single or with multiple lotteries. Our research
methods are partially inspired by Shi (2015), but we investigated some novel
policies as well. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these policies is the
way that distance is used in the priorities.
The classic way of creating proximity priorities is the catchment area
system, where the city is partitioned into areas and the students living in an
area have the highest priority in all schools in that area. This simple method can
be seen as unfair, as one student can have a higher priority than another student,
even though the actual distance of her location to the school is greater than
for the other child. Therefore instead of catchment areas, most applications
have switched to absolute or relative distance based priorities. The simplest
absolute distance based policy is the walk-zone priority scheme, used in many
US cities (e.g. New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a)), where the children
living within a well-defined walking distance are in the high distance priority
group for that school and the ties are broken by lottery. Strict priorities based
on absolute distances are used in Sweden as well (Andersson, 2017). However,
there were also discussions and court cases about the fairness of such absolute
distance based priorities1.
The absolute distance based priority schemes can be unfair for those living
far from all (or most) of the (good) schools, therefore the so-called relative
distance based methods are also commonly used in many applications (e.g.
Calsamiglia & Gu¨ell (2014); Shi (2015)). The relative distance priority means
that we give the highest priority to all children for their closest Kindergarten,
no matter how far that is, and the children will be in the second priority group
in their second closest Kindergarten, and so on. A rough version of this rule is
to give high priority for all children in a given number of closest schools.
Barcelona changed its catchment area systems to a relative distance system
in 2007. After the change, students have priority in at least six of their closest
1 In the city of Lund parents have challenged allocation decisions in court based on an alternative
option distance argument. The city used the absolute distance priority in their allocation, but
some parents have found this policy unfair, as they would have to travel 1000m more to their
second choice school than to their first choice school, whilst there was another student who
would only need to travel 650m more if allocated to their second choice school rather than
their first choice school. The court accepted this argument and gave a seat to the appealing
student in their first choice school.
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schools (Calsamiglia & Gu¨ell, 2014, Section 5.1)2. In Boston, another relative
distance policy was proposed recently by Shi (2015), mainly in order to reach
the city’s aim to cut down busing costs.
Note that there are also applications where the distance based priorities are
considered unfair, as they can limit equal access to good schools. The Ams-
terdam school choice system (de Haan et al., 2015) does not use any distance
based priority, only a pure lottery. In the Harku case, where Kindergartens are
of more or less the same quality, the authority was in favour of using the dis-
tance based priorities in order to decrease the overall commuting costs and also
to satisfy the preferences of the parents (typically for nearby Kindergartens).
Based on the unfairness of the catchment area system described above, we
only considered absolute and relative distance based priority approaches. We
explain the distance-based priorities that we studied in more detail in Section 3
with examples.
Besides the distance, we also investigated different ways of taking the
sibling priorities into account and also the way the lotteries are conducted
in case of ties. The way the distance and sibling factors are considered has
already been studied in the literature (Dur et al., 2013). The particular solution
chosen for the 2016 transitory system is an interesting rotation priority scheme,
which can lead to a well-balanced solution with respect to the two factors.
Regarding the lotteries, we analysed the effects of using a single lottery for all
Kindergartens compared to using multiple lotteries (one at each Kindergarten),
and we have seen results similar to other research papers (Ashlagi & Nikzad,
2015).
As the second main contribution of our paper, we present a sensitivity
analysis of various metrics of fairness and efficiency of policy designs based
on counter-factual preference profiles. The policies that provide the best
solutions for the current Harku data may not be ideal for other applications or
robust for Harku, where the preferences of the parents are different. This can
be the case in cities, or in other countries with different Kindergarten/school
qualities, or for applications at different education levels (e.g. primary and
2 “Before 2007, the city was divided into fixed neighbourhoods. The neighbourhoods varied
in size for semi-public and public schools, but were conceptually the same. For semi-public
schools, the neighbourhood coincided with the administrative district. For public schools, the
neighbourhoods were smaller areas within the administrative district. The new neighbourhoods
are based on distance between schools and family residences. An area (specifically, a minimum
convex polygon) around every block of houses in the city was established to include at least
the six closest schools (three public and three semi-public).”
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secondary schools). Therefore, we found it important to investigate the effects
of changes in priorities in the performance of different policies (i.e. different
priority structures for the student-optimal Deferred-Acceptance mechanism).
As a novel approach, we studied the fairness (or equal access) of the allocations
measured by the probabilities of getting placed in the first choice schools.
In general our results indicate that preference structures, more precisely
their endogeneity with respect to proximity, influence policy design. However,
we advocate a relatively simple policy that prioritises siblings first and relative
distance second. Relative distance gives all children priority in the closest
Kindergarten independently of absolute distance from it. This policy is superior
to others by our fairness criteria, especially when preferences of the families
are aligned with policy priorities.
We structure our paper as follows. In Section 2 we review the practices
and processes of Kindergarten choice of an Estonian municipality, Harku,
before the process was redesigned on the basis of our recommendations in
2016. In Section 3 we define seven alternative policies and the descriptive
statistics of our data, including our results from computational experiments.
Finally, we discuss additional mechanism design challenges with some policy
recommendations in Section 4 and give conclusions in Section 5.
2. MATCHING MECHANISM DESIGN
The design of an allocation mechanism is usually based on a two-sided match-
ing market model, in this case between 1) families and 2) Kindergartens.
Participants on both sides have linear orderings over the participants on the
other side. Families have preferences over Kindergartens and they seek to get
places at their most preferred Kindergartens. Kindergartens have a priority
ranking over children. Priorities become important if there are fewer places
available in a particular Kindergarten than the number of families who would
like to be allocated to that Kindergarten. In those circumstances, Kindergartens
accept children who are higher on their priority list, which in practice usually
means children who live closer and/or who have a sibling in the Kindergarten.
Kindergartens do not seek to admit higher priority children. This practice is
different from some applications of two-sided markets. In college admissions
for example (Gale & Shapley, 1962), both students and colleges seek to get
more preferred matches, therefore they might act strategically in the allocation
mechanism.
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There are two prominent strategy-proof mechanisms for solving matching
problems, the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) and the Top-Trading Cycles (TTC)
mechanisms (Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 2003). The DA mechanism guaran-
tees that no preferences and priorities (policies in our case) are violated, and
there is no child who could get a place in a more preferred Kindergarten by
priority, so there are no blocking pairs. A matching with no blocking pairs is
called stable. A blocking pair can also be seen as a child having justified envy,
since there is a family that would prefer a Kindergarten that either has free
places or has accepted a child with lower priority. These kinds of justified envy
situations are not tolerated in most applications (Pathak & So¨nmez, 2013), and
are sometimes even prohibited by law. Thus, stability is a crucial property for
most applications.
While there are potentially a number of stable allocations (Knuth, 1997),
the child-proposing DA mechanism that is usually implemented results in the
best possible preference for all families among the stable solutions, and this
option also makes it safe for the families to reveal their true preferences.
The theoretical properties and disadvantages of DA were studied by Haeringer
& Klijn (2009), backed by evidence from laboratory experiments (Calsamiglia
et al., 2010) and by practical applications across the world (Pathak & So¨nmez,
2013). In addition to advocating DA, the main policy implications of these
studies indicate that for an efficiency gain, it is advised to increase the bounds
on the number of collected preferences or to abolish the limit on the number
of submitted preferences.
Before its redesign, the application process of the Harku municipality had
many design features, but it was not a transparent system. Families could
submit up to three ordered choices. The application date and the home address
were also collected. The application date was relevant for the allocation, as
families with an earlier application date had higher priority. Therefore, families
tended to submit their applications as early as possible, usually a few weeks
after the birth of the child. The application data typically remained unchanged
until the actual allocation occurred, which could make the originally true
preferences out of date (e.g. it was possible that the family moved to a different
place or their older sibling has received a place in a different Kindergarten
during the waiting period). The address could be a factor, as some heads of
Kindergartens considered it when assigning places. Secondly, a qualifying
condition for a Kindergarten place is that the parents have to be registered
residents in Harku, and residency is based on where local taxes are collected.
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Moreover, the matching was done manually using the following procedural
rules. First, the number of vacant places was settled by January of each year,
when the allocation process started. Place offers were made to families by the
heads of Kindergartens if their Kindergarten was the first choice of the family.
Second, if there were more families than places, then priority was given to
the applications with earlier registration dates, although proximity or siblings
could also be occasionally relevant. Third, if an offer was accepted, the child
became assigned to the Kindergarten, otherwise that place was offered to the
subsequent family on the waiting list.
In the case of unassigned children, the procedural rules where complicated
and discretionary. Generally the heads of the Kindergarten communicated
with each other to find a place for the children who remained unassigned. In
the case of families who ordered popular Kindergarten at the top of their list
and remained unassigned in the first round, their second or third choice was
considered, although these could already be full. If that was the case, the
families with an earlier application date would be rejected from their second
choice because the children already assigned there had listed that Kindergarten
as their first preference, irrespective of their application dates. Thus, some
children were allocated to a less preferred Kindergarten, simply because of
how the family ordered their preferences. This is a well-known property of
the Immediate-Acceptance mechanism (e.g. Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 2003)
and the procedure that had been used in Harku until 2015 was very similar to
this.
2.1. Building a mechanism for Kindergarten seat allocation
Our redesign of the Harku Kindergarten allocation mechanism inspired by
the literature has four main areas as described in Table 1. The application
procedure before 2016 which was initiated by collecting preferences had
several drawbacks. First, since parents could get higher priority if they applied
earlier, they tended to apply soon after the birth of their child. However, during
the subsequent three years, the preferences of the families could change. This
situation was usually not reflected in the application data, thus resulting in a
high number of cancellations. Second, families could only list their top three
choices. Limited preference not only created a large number of unassigned
children, but also manipulation with the revelation of preferences.
Our design changed the data collection procedure and the number of
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Table 1: Redesign of Harku mechanism
2015 2016
Application procedure
Applications are collected after the
birth of the child due to prioritising
according to application dates
Applications are collected from 1
January until 1 February for allocat-
ing places from 1 September of the
same year
Limited preference lists
Limited to three Kindergartens
List all Kindergartens they are will-
ing to attend (no limit)
Priorities (policies)
Not clearly defined
See Section 3.2 for policy design al-
ternatives
Matching mechanism
Decentralised mechanism which
has some properties of Serial dic-
tatorship and Boston (Immediate-
Acceptance)
Deferred-Acceptance
preferences collected. Families make application in the matching platform3
during monthly period six months before the service delivery (1. September)
and list all their preferences. Giving up application date as a priority will be a
necessary result of the procedural amendments.
Finally, the central allocation mechanism applied until 2016 was not trans-
parent, the priorities were not clearly defined or adhered to by the heads of the
Kindergartens. The first priority of the application date was sometimes violated.
Children with siblings were usually considered to have higher priority, but not
always. Our design introduces clearly defined priority metrics and a centralised
allocation system that ensures that the criteria are always followed. Moreover,
instead of an unstable and manipulable Immediate-Acceptance mechanism we
propose the child-proposing DA. This is a standard method for school choice
(Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez, 2003), which eliminates justified envy, and gives
incentive for the families to state their true preferences.
3 https://www.haldo.ee/
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2.2. Particularities of the 2016 system
Before the final implementation of our platform-based matching design, there
was a transitory system in place in Harku in 2016 that partially applied our de-
sign recommendations, but experimented with priorities. Families were asked
to rank all seven Kindergartens. Additionally, the home address, application
date, status of siblings and the child’s birth date were collected. The allocation
process was designed on the basis of the DA mechanism with slots (Dur et
al., 2013) while policy transformation regarding fixing priorities was more
complex. There were four types of priorities that are defined per position as
follows, in the order of precedence:
1. siblings, distance, age, application date
2. distance, age, application date, siblings
3. application date, siblings, distance, age
4. age, application date, siblings, distance
5. siblings, distance, age, application date
6. distance, age, application date, siblings
...
The positions are considered in order, with families first applying to the
first position, then the second position, etc. This can also be thought of as
each Kindergarten being split into a number of seats, with each seat potentially
having a unique priority criteria. Then, the preferences of the families are
modified so that within each Kindergarten, they rank the position with the
higher precedence more highly. If the number of available places is not exactly
divisible by four, then some type of priorities might have more positions
available than others.
The main reason for the complicated policy design or for considering
the four types of priorities rotationally was backed by the argument of equal
treatment. Granting equal opportunity to all ”types of families” (the ones that
have siblings; those living nearby; early applicants; and families with an older
child) was the preference of the local municipality. In future allocations, the
application date will not be used. It was used here as some families still had
the expectation of being allocated by the application date.
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The precedence order of priority classes matters in the allocation procedure,
as shown by Dur et al. (2013) by demonstrating that a simple priority scheme
might be discriminating for some groups. For instance, let us assume there
are five seats with siblings and distance priority and a further five seats with
only distance priority. There are more than five children with a sibling and in
total more than ten children. If for the first five positions we would consider
children with siblings and then by distance, this would be disadvantageous for
children with siblings compared to first only considering distance and then
siblings as well as distance. In the latter case, some children with siblings
might already be allocated by distance alone, so other children with siblings
have lower competition and a better chance of getting a desired place. On
the other hand, it might occur that some children living closer have an unfair
disadvantage. The aim of the rotating scheme is to balance these two effects.
That leads us to the equal treatment issues related to policy design.
3. POLICY DESIGN
3.1. Efficiency and fairness
In mechanism design the goals are usually related to designing an allocation
method that maximises a form of efficiency, while not violating some con-
straint(s). In the matching domain, the usual criterion is selecting a Pareto
optimal matching among a set of stable matchings. In a public resource two-
sided matching setting, e.g. school seats, usually in fact two selections are
made: first, the priorities of applicants and second, the mechanism. In a school
choice setting, the priorities are often based on siblings and distance, although
there are other alternatives (MatchinginPractice, 2016). However, in designing
the allocation mechanism these priorities are usually treated as a given.
When evaluating the allocation methods we concentrate on two main
criteria: efficiency and fairness. Efficiency characterises the level at which we,
as designers, can satisfy the preferences of the applicants. Thus, we look at
the average allocated preference. We also include the percentage of applicants
receiving their first preference as this is often the case and the average might
not always be a good indicator.
In addition to efficiency and stability (lack of envy), our policy design is
driven by equality concerns. In the literature on distributive justice, discussion
on fairness (fair access in our case) is often accompanied by discussion on
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the principles of affirmative action, i.e. the Rawlsian difference principle
(Rawls, 1971). In our case, fair access is defined as the chance for the family to
access their most preferred Kindergarten. Moreover, we include in our design
some positive discrimination, or controlled choice, through policies such as
prioritising siblings.
Fair access is essentially different from the efficiency metrics for the
priorities of local municipalities and the preferences of families. The goal of
fair access is to provide an opportunity for every child to get a place at their
most preferred Kindergarten. As some families might live far away from all
Kindergartens (see Appendix C), they would always be low on the priority list
for any Kindergarten. We measure fair access as the proportion of families
placed in their most preferred Kindergarten on two levels, at least 10% chance
and 50% chance. This is similar to access to quality in (Shi, 2015) where
quality, in addition to being ranked high, contains an objective quality metric.
Since there is no quality ranking for a Kindergarten in our case and only a
small number of Kindergartens we look at the probability of being allocated
to the first choice. Since not all policy designs use lotteries, some will be
inherently unfair in terms of fair access.
The mechanism also allows the local authorities to have social objectives,
which are usually, but not always aligned with the preferences of the parents.
The two most prominent goals are
• having siblings in the same Kindergarten, and
• placing children in a Kindergarten near their home.
Prioritisation of proximity and siblings is also recommended by the regula-
tions responsible for the allocation of Kindergarten places (“Preschool Child
Care Institutions Act”, 2014). While prioritising proximity and siblings is
common practice in the case of school and Kindergarten choice design, being
favoured as the means to sustain community cohesion and avoid unreasonable
transportation costs (see Shi, 2015, for instance), this practice may cause var-
ious concerns. The proximity principle may lead to problems in segregated
areas, where it may result in the concentration of children from a similar socio-
economic background into the same Kindergartens. Further social objectives
could be the prioritisation of disadvantaged families or children with special
needs, but there was no access to this kind of information in the data, so those
goals were disregarded in this study. However, the main goal is still to provide
families with a place at their most preferred Kindergartens.
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3.2. Operationalisation of policy designs
A short list of social objectives indicated in the previous section does not mean
that policy designs are limited to two alternatives, as the priority structures
for siblings and proximity have many variants. Children with siblings might
always have priority over others, or might only be prioritised over families
living further away. Proximity can also be considered in many different ways,
such as a walk-zone or a catchment area or a geographical distance.
A simple way to consider geographic aspects is to define catchment areas
for each Kindergarten, and prioritise the children living in the catchment area
where the Kindergarten is located. The drawback of this method is that these
priorities may not reflect the personalised distances, as a Kindergarten might be
relatively far from an address in the same area, whilst another Kindergarten in a
different area can actually be nearby. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to
use personalised distances. We can use continuous (real) distances or discretise
them somehow, for instance giving priority to a Kindergarten within a 10-
minute walking distance, or giving priority to the closest, or several closest
Kindergartens. Another option is to give high priority to a child in a number
of nearby Kindergartens. A special version of the latter so-called menu system
has been evaluated and used in Boston school choice (Shi, 2015). Below we
specify the distance-based priorities that we used in our policies.
• Absolute: Strict priorities based on the personalised absolute distances
between the child’s location and the school, measured in walk time or
kilometres.
• Walk-zone: Coarse priorities based on the above-described absolute
distance. A child is in the high priority group for a school if she lives
within a 10-minute walking distance to this school.
• Relative: Every child is in the highest distance-based priority group
in her closest school, she is in the second highest priority group in the
second closest school, and so on.
• 3 closest: A binary variant of the above-defined relative distance policy,
where every child is in the high priority group of a school, if this school
is among the three closest schools for this child.
When we consider the children in walk-zones to have a higher priority,
followed by children with siblings, the following priority groups are obtained:
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1. siblings in walk-zones, 2. children in walk-zones, 3. siblings, 4. the rest.
Siblings could also be considered to have a higher priority, which would result
in the priority groups: 1. siblings in walk-zones, 2. siblings, 3. children in
walk-zones, 4. the rest. This simple classification is used in many US cities,
such as New York (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005a) and Boston (Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al., 2005b), together with a randomised lottery for breaking ties. The lottery
can also be conducted in two ways, either as a single lottery which is used
in all Kindergartens, or as multiple lotteries, one for each Kindergarten. The
typical choice, used in most US school choice programmes and also in Irish
higher education admissions (L. Chen, 2012), is the single lottery. We will
investigate both in our computational experiments. This question is discussed
further by Ashlagi & Nikzad (2015) and Pathak & Sethuraman (2011).
If it is considered undesirable that a high proportion of children get admitted
by sibling priority, then one option is to set a quota for siblings, for example
50% of the places. In this case, there is high priority for siblings for only some
proportion of the places available, and the remaining places are prioritised by
distance only. In such a setting, how the allocation is implemented is crucial.
It can be done by allocating the places for siblings first and then the remaining
seats or in reverse. Dur et al. (2013) showed that the reverse approach can
benefit children with siblings, and Hafalir et al. (2013) showed that reserving
places for a certain minority results in a better allocation for the minority than
limiting the quota for the majority does. Under the latter policy, both groups
(minority and majority) could be worse off. We evaluate policy design by the
reservation of places for siblings or for families living nearby. In Harku, only
about 20% of children have a sibling, so 20% of the places were set to have a
sibling priority.
The Deferred-Acceptance algorithm can be slightly modified to accommo-
date for reserves and quotas. The priority quotas can be considered as separate
Kindergartens. In this variant, the child is first placed in a quota group high in
the precedence order and, if rejected, the child is then placed lower, etc. Thus,
each child will be placed in the highest possible precedence quota group.
In this study, in order to explore the described aspects, we settled on seven
priority policies (summarised in Table 2) for evaluation:
DA1. Children with siblings always have the highest priority and children
living closer have higher priority. Priority classes would be considered
in the order: 1) siblings; 2) walking distance.
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Table 2: Summary of policies (priority order in parentheses)
Policy Distance (D) Siblings (S) Lottery Quotas (Precedence)
DA1 absolute (2) (1) no no
DA2 walk-zone (2) (1) (3) no
DA3 walk-zone (1) (2) (3) no
DA4 3 closest (2) (1) (3) no
DA5 absolute (2) (1) no [80%, 20%] ([D, S+D])
DA6 absolute (2) (1) no [20%, 80%] ([S+D, D])
DA7 relative (2) (1) (3) no
DA2. Children with siblings always have the highest priority, then children
in the walk-zone have higher priority. The walk-zone is defined as a
10-minute walking distance from home. Additional ties are ordered by a
random lottery for all Kindergartens. The order of priority classes is: 1)
siblings + walk-zone; 2) siblings; 3) walk-zone; 4) the remainder.
DA3. Children in the walk-zone always have the highest priority, then children
with siblings have higher priority. Additional ties are ordered by a
random lottery for all Kindergartens. The order of priority classes is: 1)
siblings + walk-zone; 2) walk-zone; 3) siblings; 4) the remainder.
DA4. Children with siblings always have the highest priority, and children
have higher priority for the three closest Kindergartens. Additional
ties are ordered by a random lottery for all Kindergartens. Priority
precedence order: 1) siblings + one-of-three-closest; 2) siblings; 3)
one-of-three-closest; 4) the remainder.
DA5. Children with siblings have the highest priority for the reserved 20%
of places, otherwise priority is by distance. Precedence order: 1) by
distance up to 80%; 2) children with siblings + distance up to 20%; 3)
remaining places, if any, by distance.
DA6. Children with siblings have the highest priority for the reserved 20% of
places, otherwise priority is by distance. Precedence order: 1) children
with siblings + distance up to 20%; 2) remaining places, if any, by
distance.
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DA7. Children with siblings always have the highest priority, and children have
higher priority in the closest Kindergarten, second highest in the second-
closest, etc. Additional ties are ordered by a random lottery for all
Kindergartens. Priority precedence order: 1) siblings; 2) closest-number.
To demonstrate the effect of policies we construct a simple example. Let
us assume we have four children C = {c1,c2,c3,c4} and four Kindergartens
K = {k1,k2,k3,k4}. In Table 3 we show the distances between homes and
Kindergartens. We have no children with siblings in this example.
Table 3: Distances between homes and Kindergartens (km-s)
km k1 k2 k3 k4
c1 .7 1.2 1.0 1.7
c2 .4 .6 .3 .7
c3 .9 .5 .4 .3
c4 .8 .3 .9 1.0
Assuming that walk-zone distance is ≤ .6 km, the resulting priorities are in
Table 4. We can observe that with absolute distance or walk-zone the child c1
would not have a high priority in any Kindergarten. However with the 3-closest
policy, there is at least some chance of having the highest priority in some
Kindergarten, and with relative distance, each child has the highest priority in
at least one Kindergarten. While this is not always guaranteed with relative
distance, the lottery has lower impact compared to the 3-closest policy.
3.3. Data and initial policy design comparison
From a total of 152 families, 151 ranked all seven Kindergartens and only one
family submitted a single Kindergarten as their preference. Table 5 shows
the number of available places in each Kindergarten. Also 37 (about 24% of)
children have a sibling in one of the Kindergartens.
Table 6 compares the allocations over all the policies with the submitted
preferences. The listed Harku allocation does not exclude those few families
who declined their assigned place. However, many (115, i.e. 76%) of the
families were allocated to their most preferred Kindergarten. Since most
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Table 4: Distance priorities
absolute (DA1) walk-zone (DA2, DA3)
k1 c2 ≺ c1 ≺ c4 ≺ c3 c2 ≺ {c1,c3,c4}
k2 c4 ≺ c3 ≺ c2 ≺ c1 {c2,c3,c4} ≺ c1
k3 c2 ≺ c3 ≺ c4 ≺ c1 {c2,c3} ≺ {c1,c4}
k4 c3 ≺ c2 ≺ c4 ≺ c1 c3 ≺ {c1,c2,c3}
3-closest (DA4) relative (DA7)
k1 {c1,c2,c4} ≺ c3 c1 ≺ {c2,c4} ≺ c3
k2 {c1,c2,c3,c4} c4 ≺ {c1,c2,c3}
k3 {c1,c2,c3,c4} c2 ≺ {c1,c3} ≺ c4
k4 c3 ≺ {c1,c2,c4} c3 ≺ {c1,c2,c4}
families ranked all Kindergartens and there are more places than children, no
children remained unassigned.
For policies that included lotteries, we computed averages over 20 lotteries.
In the parentheses we show the standard error over the lotteries. In addition, we
compared policies using a single (S) lottery for all Kindergartens or multiple
(M) lotteries, one for each Kindergarten.
By using a simpler policy such as the DA1, we saw that there are fewer
families receiving a place at their first choice Kindergarten4 than with the
transitory Harku priority system. Moreover, two children (about 5%) are not
allocated to the same Kindergarten as their siblings with the transitory rule,
but with most other policies all siblings end up in the same Kindergarten.
The only exception to this is DA3, which has siblings as a second priority
over walk-zone, and on average also allocated 95% of siblings in the same
Kindergarten, but fewer children to their first preferences.
It seems that the transitory policy of Harku invoked the so-called vacancy
chains (Blum et al., 1997), where at the expense of one child with a sibling
several others could obtain better places along an augmenting path. In par-
ticular, by denying places for two children in the same Kindergarten as their
sibling, around seven more families could obtain their first choices. This leads
4 A more detailed allocated preference data is available in appendix B
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Table 5: Harku allocation
Kindergarten Number of places
A 20
B 20
C 34
D 18
E 20
F 38
G 5
Total 155
to an interesting trade-off between the goals of satisfying the sibling priority
or granting the first choice of slightly more parents.
In 2016, the allocations based on policies DA5 and DA6 were exactly the
same. This indicates that the gain in allocating more children to their first
preference with Harku’s policy is not due to allocating children to a closer
Kindergarten, but due to application date and age priorities. Therefore, if these
two criteria are not to be used in future policies, we expect that the rotation
scheme based only on siblings and proximity will provide allocations similar
to DA1, DA5 and DA6, assuming that the proportion of children and seats is
similar.
3.4. Policy sensitivity to preferences
When comparing policies, one may wonder how sensitive the results are
to changes in the preferences of parents. This can also be important when
applying our policy recommendations in other applications. In Kindergarten
allocation, and sometimes also in school choice, when the Kindergartens are
more or less of the same quality, the most important factor influencing the
preferences of parents is the location. Therefore, we conducted a comparative
study wherein the intensities of this factor in the preferences of parents is varied.
We evaluated the efficiency and fairness of the alternative policies accordingly.
For the generation of preferences, we use the locations and the information on
the siblings from the 2016 preference data. The detailed description of how
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Table 6: Year 2016 comparison of policies using reported preferences
Policy
Mean
prefer-
ence
First
Mean
distance
(km)
With
siblings
Harku 1.68 115 4.24 95 %
DA 1 1.76 110 4.26 100 %
DA 2 (M)a
1.85
(0.01)
98.75
(0.61)
4.59
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 2 (S)
1.72
(0.01)
108.05
(0.61)
4.44
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 3 (M)
1.83
(0.01)
98.30
(0.79)
4.51
(0.02)
95 %
(0.25 %)
DA 3 (S)
1.72
(0.01)
107.75
(0.38)
4.45
(0.02)
96 %
(0.3 %)
DA 4 (M)
1.91
(0.01)
89.25
(1.06)
4.53
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 4 (S)
1.75
(0.01)
104.85
(0.7)
4.49
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 5 1.76 110 4.26 100 %
DA 6 1.76 110 4.26 100 %
DA 7 (M)
1.78
(0.01)
107.60
(0.47)
4.30
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 7 (S)
1.76
(0.01)
107.75
(0.47)
4.31
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
a For policies with lotteries, (M) indicates multiple tie-breaking lotteries and (S) single.
The standard errors over lotteries are in parentheses.
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we generate the preferences of parents can be found in the Appendix A.
We characterise preference profiles by the conditional probability of a
family ranking a closer Kindergarten higher (Pr(ri  r j | di < d j), i 6= j) and
ranking a Kindergarten with a sibling higher (Pr(ri r j | si > s j), i 6= j). Where
ri is rank of Kindergarten i, di is distance to Kindergarten i and si is one when
there is a sibling and zero otherwise. In the collected 2016 preference data, the
Pr(ri  r j | di < d j) = 0.81 and the Pr(ri  r j | si > s j) = 1.0, i 6= j.
The main dimensions of the evaluation are the preference rank achieved in
an allocation as well as the effect of the average distance from Kindergartens
and the share of siblings in the same Kindergarten.
For statistical comparison, we generated twenty preference profiles of each
of the parameter values. A total of 200 preference profiles were generated.
For each policy that has a lottery, we ran twenty different randomised lotteries
for each instance. As we saw in Table 6 the standard errors over the twenty
lotteries are small. All the figures of the results show the smoothed5 results of
the ten allocations over policies with a 95% confidence bound. For policies
with lotteries, there are results with a single (S) and multiple (M) lotteries over
Kindergartens.
Each year the number of available Kindergarten positions varies. However,
on average about 20 places should be available in each Kindergarten each
year, as one group of children leaves for school. Occasionally, there might
be more or fewer places. In our experiments, we set the number of available
places at 20 in each Kindergarten. However, this creates additional competition
and the resulting matched ranks will be lower (see Ashlagi et al., 2013a,b)
in these experiments than in the actual data in Table 6. Additionally, in our
interpretations we implicitly assume the effect of the competition will be
similar for all the policies. We discuss here only the Deferred-Acceptance
based results6. In addition we removed policies DA5 and DA6 from the chart,
as these matchings were usually almost the same as DA1.
Figures 1a and 1b demonstrate the average preferences obtained and the
proportion of families getting their first choices for all policies. Policy DA7 is
the most sensitive to changes in the preferences of families. When preferences
are strictly based on distance with conditional probability of Pr(ri  r j | di <
d j)→ 1.0, one of the highest average rank scores is produced, one similar to
5 smoothed with local polynomial regression
6 In Appendix D we also provide for comparison results based on Top Trading Cycles algorithms,
as defined by Abdulkadirog˘lu & So¨nmez (2003).
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Figure 1: Conditional probability of distance
other policies such as DA1, DA5 and DA6. Surprisingly, when the preferences
of families are close to random, with conditional probability of Pr(ri  r j |
di < d j)→ 0.5, then DA7 (S) is the policy that has one of the lowest average
ranks and the lowest number of families with a first preference. Policies that do
worse are the ones using multiple lotteries, one per Kindergarten. In addition,
the difference of having a single or multiple lotteries for Kindergartens is not
very significant for DA7, most likely due to lower usage of tie-breaking in this
policy compared to others with a lottery.
At face value, DA7 seems to be the most egalitarian policy as every family
has the highest priority in at least one of the Kindergartens. However, it seems
that families that do not prefer to be in the closest Kindergarten tend to be
rejected more often from their preferred Kindergartens further away where
they have a lower priority. As the matched rank drops more in DA7 than other
policies, when Pr(ri  r j | di < d j)→ 0.5. Since the preferences and priorities
are not aligned, the probability of the family being rejected in some round of
the process is higher. The probability of being rejected at a certain point seems
to be smaller for other policies.
In terms of average matched preference rank, the policies DA2 and DA3
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are almost indistinguishable from each other, most likely because there are
too few siblings in this data. Nevertheless, it is always better to use a single
rather than multiple tie-breaking lotteries for both of these policies. The
average preference achieved is always better with a single lottery and also
there are more families with their first preference (Figure 1b). Policies with
a single lottery, such as DA2 (S), DA3 (S) and DA4 (S) – with the exception
of DA7 (S) – are significantly better for families in most situations. Only
when Pr(ri  r j | di < d j)> 0.9, did policies DA1, DA5 and DA6, which use
absolute distance, turn out to be better than the single lottery policies.
The policies DA1 and DA6 always produce exactly the same matching,
DA5 is occasionally slightly different (for about 2-6 children), but the aggregate
results are still very similar. This is most likely because the selected reserve of
20 % is close to the percentage of siblings in the data.
Interestingly, most policies, with the exception of DA7, are quite robust to
changes in preferences. The same proportion of families almost always receive
their first preferences, about 50% to 60% with DA2, DA3 and DA4 and 60%
to 70% with DA1, DA5 and DA6. There is a slight increase in the average
preference when preferences become determined by distance. With DA7, the
proportion varies widely between 40% and 70%, and families fare better when
preferences are aligned with distance.
Figure 2a shows the average distance between families and Kindergartens.
The average distance is smaller for all policies when the preferences of families
are determined more by distance. As might be expected, the smallest average
distance is always with DA1 (including DA5 and DA6), as these policies are
aimed to minimise distance. The average distance is the largest with DA2 and
DA3, policies based on walk-zones, probably caused by the randomness in
the priorities of Kindergartens. Furthermore, these policies have a slightly
lower average distance with a single tie-breaking lottery, when preferences
are correlated with distance. On the other hand, it is usually the case that if
preferences are random, the multiple tie-breaking lotteries have a lower average
distance than single lotteries. A small improvement in average distance in
policies with lotteries is obtained by not using discretisation by walk-zones
and instead having a higher priority for a fixed number of Kindergartens, as in
DA4.
With random preferences, there is a trade-off between achieved preference
and average distance in the results obtained by DA7 (M) and, DA2 (M) and
DA3 (M), where DA4 (M) is at the middle point among these policies in this
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Figure 2: Average distance and conditional probability of distance in prefer-
ences
aspect. Policy DA7 always achieves the lowest average distance among the
lottery policies, others produce better matched ranking. When preferences are
more correlated with distance, DA7 performs better according to both average
preference and distance.
Figure 2b depicts the probability of children being in the same Kindergarten
as their siblings. When the preferences of families are random with respect
to siblings, most policies place about 40% to 60% of children in the same
Kindergarten as their siblings. When families prefer closer Kindergartens, then
more siblings end up in the same place. This higher percentage is most likely
due to siblings already being in a nearby Kindergarten. We have also added
a 45 degree line, indicating that policies that are below this level have some
children, who would prefer a Kindergarten with a sibling, result in children
being assigned to a different Kindergarten. Multiple lottery policies seem to
be better at placing children in the same Kindergarten with siblings.
In Figures 3a and 3b, the probability of a child being matched to the
family’s first preference in at least one lottery is measured. This is a measure
of fairness, or fair (equal) access to Kindergartens, which is similar to the
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Figure 3: Fairness of access
measure of access to quality used by Shi (2015). We have plotted the fairness
of access for policies DA1, DA5 and DA6, even though there is no sensible
interpretation, since there are no lotteries. However, these policies are still
useful for comparison.
With the lottery policies DA2, DA3 and DA4, with both single and multiple
lotteries, about 60% to 95% of families have about a 10% chance of being
granted a place in a Kindergarten that is their first preference. The DA4 (S) is
the best performer when preferences are aligned with distance and DA2 (S)
and DA3 (S) when preferences only have a Kindergarten effect. Policy DA7
(S) comes close to DA4 (S) only when preferences are almost perfectly aligned
with distance.
However, when we make our fairness notion slightly stronger, i.e. when
there has to be at least a 50% chance of a place in the family’s first choice
Kindergarten, the proportion of families achieving this drops to only about
40%. This is even lower than the case with deterministic policies like DA1.
Therefore, it seems that with lotteries we can give some families a small 10%,
chance of getting their first preference, but as a result, some families lose their
first preferences. With a larger chance, 50%, there are more families losing
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their first preference than those gaining.
In terms of trade-offs, the policy DA4 (S) is better on fairness and average
matched preference, but worse on average matched distance. DA1 and similar
policies do better on average matched rank and distance, however they fare
worse on fairness, i.e. families living far away from all Kindergartens have
a smaller chance of a preferred match. When preferences are not entirely
determined by distance, then these two (DA1 and DA4) are the best options
to choose from. However, with distance-based preferences, DA7 can prove
to be an improvement. In the case of DA7, fairness is almost as good as with
DA4, average distance was a significant improvement over DA4 and average
allocated rank very close to DA1.
4. FURTHER ISSUES
We identify a dozen additional special features that should be further consid-
ered in the (re-)design of the mechanism in Harku. However, many of these
features may pose significant challenges and require additional research. We
describe these issues and give recommendations for possible adjustments in
the allocation mechanism.
Children with special needs. In larger cities, there are schools for children
with special needs, but in smaller municipalities these pupils are mixed with
others. The standard practice is for Kindergartens to reserve places for children
with special needs who require more attention and are thus considered to take
up the space of three children. Usually, it is not known beforehand if there
will be any such cases and the special needs may only become evident later.
However, in most cases the extra places remain free and can be subsequently
allocated to other children. Obviously, this has some effect on the fairness of
the allocation.
A possible solution would be to have this data available before allocation
and to take it into account in the allocation process. However, evaluating all of
the applicants in advance could be very costly compared to the extra efforts
needed for the reallocation process and the potential issues arising from the
extended solution. It would be helpful if the parents of children that are likely
to need special treatment were to register for evaluation. It should then be
guaranteed that their chances of admission to their preferred Kindergartens
would not be worsened, perhaps by giving priority for a number of places in
each Kindergarten to such children.
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Allocation in multiple rounds. Harku currently allocates students in multi-
ple rounds, since two extra places could arise in each Kindergarten to which
no student with special needs is admitted. The proportion of disadvantaged
families is about 10% (PTVRR, 2015) and children with special needs make
up about 3% (Paat et al., 2011). This question is similar to the question of the
design of two-stage allocation mechanisms (Dur & Kesten, 2014) and also to
the design of appeal processes (Dur & Kesten, 2015). The first option is to
allocate the extra places exclusively among the unmatched children. This is a
simple method with no reallocation of children, but it can be seen as unfair to
families who are allocated seats in the main round and would prefer an extra
place in a Kindergarten where they have higher priority than the unallocated
children who get those extra places in the second round. The final solution
could cause justified envy for the families. In addition, the parents might also
act strategically in the main round, perhaps by not accepting an offer from the
Kindergarten listed second, especially if they have information that they are
first in the waiting list and the creation of extra places is very likely. Therefore,
it appears reasonable to let everyone apply for the extra places, as is currently
done in Harku. However, if the process is not centralised, then those who were
assigned a place in the first round but now get a better match, would conse-
quently create new available places. Even if this decentralised process could
be continued until a stable solution was reached, this proposal-rejection chain
would result in a stable matching that is the worst possible stable matching
for the reallocated children, as proved by Blum et al. (1997). Therefore, this
process would not be strategy-proof for the parents either. Hence, the only
possible solution that is strategy-proof for the parents and avoids justified envy
is a centralised second round, where parents can re-apply to all Kindergartens
with the option of keeping their assignment if they wish to do so (technically
this is achieved by putting the children already assigned to the Kindergarten
at the top of the Kindergartens’ rankings). Yet, this solution may affect a
significant number of children, and in theory possibly all of them, which could
result in high reallocation costs. These costs would be accepted by the parents,
since they would always have the option of not changing their assignment, but
could be seen as undesired by the local council and the Kindergartens.
Children with existing places. The parents of some children may request
a transfer. This is especially relevant for children attending a class for 2-3-
year olds who would like to go to a different Kindergarten for the 3-6-year
period, since the classes for children aged 2-3 may not be available in the
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Kindergartens preferred by the families. It is therefore a question of whether
the reallocation of these children should be conducted as part of the yearly
matching round. If so, these children should be guaranteed to get at least as
good a seat in the reallocation, i.e. they should have the highest priority in
their current Kindergarten. This question has been studied in the context of
Danish daycare allocation (Kennes et al., 2014), and also for the reallocation
of French teachers (Combe et al., 2015).
Overlapping admission processes. Some parents may be registered in more
than one municipality, so they are able to apply for a place for their child in
two systems, for example in Harku and in neighbouring Tallinn. This can
lead to inefficiencies due to cancellations. Similar problems arise in some US
cities where state schools and charter schools hold their admissions separately.
Furthermore, the same phenomenon has also appeared in European college
admission programmes, where an increasing number of students are applying
for programmes in several countries disturbing the national matching schemes.
Outside options with subsidies. Somewhat related to the previous issue is
the fact that private Kindergartens operate in Estonia, and some parents also
consider the option of home schooling. However, if a municipality cannot
provide enough Kindergarten places for its resident population, in some cases
it may subsidise parents who choose an alternative option. In Harku, the
local council financially supports parents who do not receive a place in a
Kindergarten, but the council may withdraw their support if the parents do not
accept a place that is offered. This conditional support can lead to strategic
considerations, since some parents may find an alternative home or private
option preferable to a local school, if and only if they receive the financial
support, but this cannot be stated in the application. This special case can
be modelled with the matching with contracts framework. A similar special
feature is found in the Hungarian higher education matching scheme, where
students can study on the same course under two different contracts, either free
of charge or with a tuition fee. Furthermore, US cadets (So¨nmez & Switzer,
2013) also face such a situation when they decide whether or not they are
willing to take on some extra years of service in order to increase their chances
of admission. The recommended solution is to let the parents list the option of
not having a place in the Kindergarten but receiving financial support instead,
when they give their applications to Kindergartens. Thus, all the listed options
are considered preferable to the outside option with no financial support. In
such a case, it is crucial that the parents-optimal stable solution is implemented
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so as to make the parents reveal their true preferences for these outside options.
Lower quotas, opening of new groups. Sometimes Kindergartens are able to
cancel groups or open new ones to fit with the applications. In particular, there
are regulations determining the minimum number of children needed to start a
new group. This feature is similar to the lower quotas used in the Hungarian
higher education matching scheme (Biro´ et al., 2010a), where programmes
may be cancelled if there is a lack of students. This is a natural requirement
that makes the education service economical, but the theoretical model for
college admissions with lower quotas is not always solvable. This means that a
fair solution does not always exist and the problem of finding a fair solution is
NP-hard. The problem becomes even more complicated if new groups can be
created, since both the closures and the openings in a Kindergarten affect the
number of students admitted elsewhere. However, clever heuristics and robust
optimisation techniques, such as integer programming (Biro´ et al., 2014) can
be used to tackle these generalised problems.
Homogeneous age groups and mixed groups. In Estonia, there are both
homogeneous age groups and mixed groups. Having only same age groups
can vary the number of groups opened in a Kindergarten, as a Kindergarten
with five groups could open only one group every three years. This would be
unsatisfactory for the local children in the years when no groups are opened.
When mixed groups are created, the number of children admitted can be
relatively stable if the available places are always filled. However, if there are
some free places left in a year, then the age distribution of the children can be
distorted.
Sharing places. In some Kindergartens, it is possible that some children
only attend part of the week and the rest of the time is taken up by other
children. This possibility again makes the underlying problem challenging to
solve. Specifically, when there is a large number of part-time students then
one might face the same problem as when allocating doctors and couples to
hospitals, which is an NP-hard problem (McDermid & Manlove, 2010).
Historic dependence of preferences. In Harku, the applications of registered
parents are listed on a public website. In Tallinn, the number of applications
already submitted to the Kindergartens is also published. If the registration
date is a criterion for priority and the parents can see the applications or the
number of applications made before their turn, then this can affect their true as
well as their submitted preferences. Potentially, if there are more applications
than places, then parents will find it risky to apply. This can depend on the
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birth date of the child, because if a child was born soon after 1 October, then
the parents could have a good chance of obtaining a place everywhere, and
so be more truthful. We did not find much evidence of significant changes
in the preferences over time in the Harku data. However, in a similar study
for Tallinn or other places where the registration date is important, attention
should be paid to the potentially biased preferences caused by the published
information about past applications.
Smooth transition to a new system. When designing the new mechanism,
it may be important to consider how to engineer a smooth transition between
the old and the final systems. This process is especially challenging in Harku,
since the old priorities were based on registration date, and those parents who
registered early may see it as unfair if this priority that they earned in the past
is suddenly neglected. Therefore, in the 2016 transitory system, the priority of
those who have already registered in the old regime is partly kept, as described
above. Regarding the future years, how long these priorities should be kept, or
whether they should be replaced with some age priority which is in correlation
with the registration dates, is still to be debated.
The role of the heads of the Kindergartens. The heads of the Kindergartens
were actively involved in the allocation system until 2015. The discussions
among the heads and the personal communication with the parents were
crucial in eliciting the true preferences of the parents and finding relatively
good solutions through informal negotiations. In the centrally coordinated
system, the head may fear losing their chance to influence the allocations, and
the same could be true for the employees of the local municipality. It should be
considered whether the heads of the Kindergartens could still have some power
to adjust the priorities, or to make other decisions about their Kindergartens,
for instance whether to open a new group or to create mixed groups.
The fairness of using proximity as a priority. Whether the use of proximity
is fair may depend on the ease and/or cost of registering. Specially circum-
stances may vary, e.g., it is almost costless (as in Hungary); there may be
some significant costs such as renting or having a flat in the area; or the family
truly has to live there (for example in Barcelona, where somebody who is
proved not to live at the stated address can lose their place). When it is easy
to register at an address, then the parents may play a strategic game in which
the first stage is to choose an address. When ownership and actual residency
are required, and the priorities are important for the parents, this can affect
the housing choices of the families, and influence house prices as well as the
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 2(1), 2017
“p˙03” — 2018/1/16 — 12:42 — page 86 — #30
86 Kindergarten allocation policy design
socio-economic distribution of the population.
Restricting the choice of the parents. A simple restriction is to allow
families to only apply to nearby Kindergartens. A more sophisticated method
is to provide personalised choice menus, such as the system proposed in the
Boston school choice mechanism (Shi, 2015). This would potentially provide
parents with a choice of schools close to them where a child’s siblings may
have attended, with a limited number of further options. The advantage of
this method over restricting the number of applications is that the mechanism
remains strategy-proof, and the parents have a simpler task of ranking the
available options. However, the disadvantage is the difficulty of estimating
the preferences of the parents and therefore, there is a risk that some highly
preferred Kindergartens could be missed out from some menus. In general,
this type of restrictive policy can improve the overall quality of the allocation
from the point of view of the municipality, perhaps by reducing the total travel
distance. That was the main motivation in the Boston school choice redesign,
as the bus costs had to be limited. However, the overall welfare of the children
could be badly affected. We do not recommend this policy for Harku, due to
the small size of the municipality, but it is suggested for consideration in larger
cities, like Tallinn.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Kindergarten matching practices in one Estonian munic-
ipality, Harku. Until 2015, the collected preferences were unlikely to reflect
the true preferences of the parents, since the data were out-of-date by the
time of the allocation, the number of applications were limited and the al-
location mechanism was not incentive-proof either. Therefore, the resulting
allocation could create justified envy and it was also lacking transparency.
In 2016, the municipality changed its allocation system mostly based on our
recommendations.
In our study, we first listed well-known practices from matching mechanism
design that present solutions to some of the problems and also provide policy
tools for the local municipalities. These practices consist of:
• getting complete rather than limited preferences from families,
• using child-proposing stable matching for allocating places,
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• defining clear policies for the local municipality based on a transparent
priority system.
In assisting in the redesign of the allocation mechanism, it emerged that
although the policy goals might be clear, the choice of exactly which imple-
mentation method to use can create significant differences in the results. In
most cases, the goals of the local municipalities are to have siblings in the
same Kindergarten and to provide a place in a Kindergarten close to home,
in addition to the main consideration of providing a place in the most pre-
ferred Kindergartens of the families. We evaluated seven different policies
for implementing the policy goals, first based on data from 2016, and then
based on generated data. The 2016 transitory system that follows our main
recommendations provides a child-optimal stable allocation under a rotational
priority structure based on four factors, such as location, siblings, registration
and birth dates. The limit on the number of applications was also removed, so
the preferences of the families can be considered truthful. Our main findings
regarding the seven policies evaluated on the real data and in the computational
experiments are summarised below.
The simplest policy is to give higher priority to children with siblings and
to families living nearby, which is policy DA1. This was also demonstrated to
be one of the most effective policies. The resulting allocation had, on average,
matched a lot of families with their most preferred Kindergarten, while also
having one of the smallest average distances. This remained true when the
preferences of families were agnostic about distance.
Policy DA1 might occasionally seem unfair, as small differences in dis-
tance might affect whether families are placed in their first preference or a
lower one. Policies DA2, DA3 and DA4 group Kindergartens by distance
within equal priority classes, DA2 and DA3 by defining a walk-zone and DA4
by having high priority in the three closest Kindergartens. Families in the
walk-zone are treated equally and priorities are defined by lottery. It appears
that the multiple tie-breaking rule might create a more egalitarian access to
Kindergartens, however it is not without its cost. The average number of
children who are placed in their most preferred Kindergarten is usually sig-
nificantly lower and the average distance is greater. However, with a single
tie-breaker over Kindergartens, families are on average allocated to their more
preferred Kindergarten, even when compared to deterministic policies like
DA1. Nevertheless, an allocation based on randomness might prove hard to
justify to families. If having more egalitarian access is important, policy DA4
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with a single tie-breaker would be the best of the three. The level of fair access
is the same, satisfaction with average preferences is the best, and distance is
the lowest.
Siblings always being given higher priority might prove another source
of seemingly unfair treatment. If a family already has a child in a particular
Kindergarten, they are almost guaranteed to get a place in the same Kinder-
garten for a sibling, even when there is another family living closer than them.
We considered two policies, DA5 and DA6, which limit the number of places
in a Kindergarten that consider having a sibling a priority at up to 20%. Even
though the number of places reserved for siblings was low, most families still
received a place in that Kindergarten if they preferred it. There is almost no
difference from policy DA1 on any measure, nor between DA5 and DA6, al-
though theoretically DA6 should provide more opportunity to nearby families,
and DA5 to children with siblings.
A clear oddity is policy DA7, which was initially designed to deliver more
equal access to Kindergartens for families who live far away from all Kinder-
gartens. While policy DA1 would give such families low priority everywhere,
DA7 would give them the highest priority in their closest Kindergarten. When
most families have a high preference for nearby Kindergartens and for those
where their siblings are, DA7 results in one of the best policy designs in all
aspects. DA7 gives many families their first preference, it has the shortest
average distance and one of the best results for equality of access. However, the
result is radically different when family preferences are mostly idiosyncratic
and are almost independent from distance. In this case, DA7 is the worst policy
of all for families. On average less than 40% of children get matched to their
first preferences, but the average distance is the one of lowest. Thus the lesson
from policy DA7 seems to be that the policy designer needs to predict the
preferences of the society fairly accurately to select a good trade-off. When
preferences and priorities are aligned, both of the main goals can be met. A
downside of this policy is that it is vulnerable when preferences and priorities
are misaligned, and then the price paid is significant in terms of efficiency and
fairness. If a local municipality aims to minimise the distances between homes
and Kindergartens, then DA1 is the best option. The latter objective recently
turned out to be crucial in Boston, where the local authority became concerned
about the busing costs (Shi, 2015).
Finally, there remain several unsolved issues that we have not tried to
address in the redesign. A dozen issues were listed along with a discussion
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about possible solutions. For example, it would be reasonable to coordinate
the allocation between neighbouring municipalities, but cooperation is usually
hard to achieve. Similarly, it would be best to know about children with special
needs before the allocation, but this is often not feasible.
A potential way to manage the shortage of Kindergarten places is to provide
monetary incentives for parents to stay at home with their children or to
seek a place in private childcare. The question of how to set this monetary
compensation in an optimal manner is also interesting in terms of future
research. Here, optimality could mean minimising the total cost of providing
childcare services in the municipality.
There remain a few interesting aspects related to designing a more flexible
mechanism which might improve the allocation outcome for families. Making
decisions on the size and the age composition of the groups in Kindergartens
and determining this in an optimal way based on the application data could
give an additional boost to the number of families receiving a place at their
most preferred Kindergarten. Some of this research has been done in terms of
lower quotas for opening groups (Biro´ et al., 2010a).
A. GENERATING COUNTER-FACTUAL PREFERENCES
We use the 2016 data for counter-factual policy evaluation. To generate the
counter-factual preferences only we use the distance between homes and
Kindergartens and sibling status in a Kindergarten. The collected preference
data is used to understand which features to use in the ranking function, the
functional form of the utility function and the fixed effects of Kindergartens.
For each family and Kindergarten we know the geographical location from
address lookup from google maps7 and Estonian Land Board (Maa-amet8)
and distance calculations taken from Google maps distance9. We have a rich
dataset for distance, as for each family-Kindergarten pair we know the driving
and walking distances in kilometres and minutes. We also have the direct
distance between the two points calculated with the haversine formula. The
features are described in Table 7.
We fit a multinomial rank-ordered logit model (Croissant, 2011), which
is similar to the model used by Shi (2015). The model assumes that families
7 https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/intro
8 http://inaadress.maaamet.ee/geocoder/bulk
9 https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/distance-matrix/intro
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Table 7: Family’s Kindergarten features
Feature Description
preference rank Families rank of the Kindergarten, be-
tween 1-7
walking distance sec walking time between family’s home and
Kindergarten, based on The Google Maps
Distance Matrix API (2015)
walking distance m walking distance between family’s home
and Kindergarten, based on The Google
Maps Distance Matrix API (2015)
driving distance sec driving time between family’s home and
Kindergarten, based on The Google Maps
Distance Matrix API (2015)
driving distance m driving distance between family’s home
and Kindergarten, based on The Google
Maps Distance Matrix API (2015)
haversine distance m direct distance between family’s home and
Kindergarten
walking distance rank Kindergarten rank by walking distance
driving distance rank Kindergarten rank by driving distance
haversine distance rank Kindergarten rank by haversine distance
sibling 1 if Kindergarten has a sibling already at-
tending, 0 otherwise
log walking distance sec log(walking distance sec)
sqrt walking distance sec
√
walking distance sec
log walking distance m log(walking distance m)
sqrt walking distance m
√
walking distance m
log driving distance sec log(drivingdistancesec)
sqrt driving distance sec
√
driving distance sec
log driving distance m log(driving distance m)
sqrt driving distance m
√
driving distance m
log haversine distance m log(haversine distance m)
sqrt haversine distance m
√
haversine distance m
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have an utility function of the form,
ui j = α j +∑
k
βk · xki j + εi j (1)
where α j are fixed effect of Kindergartens, βk is the coefficient for feature
k and εi j is the family’s personal unexplained preference. We further use
the utilities to find a probability if a ranking. In a ranked-order logit model
the probability of a ranking is a multiple of a Kindergarten begin is a par-
ticular position, which in our case is Pr(ranking1,2, ...,7) = Pr(ranking =
1) ·Pr(ranking = 2) · ... ·Pr(ranking = 7). The probability of family i ranking
Kindergarten j at some position are,
Pri j(ranking = 1) = e
ui j
∑7r=1 e
uir
Pri j(ranking = 2) = e
ui j
∑7r=2 e
uir
...
Pri j(ranking = 6) = e
ui j
∑7r=6 e
uir
(2)
First our aim is to select one of the distance metrics from Table 7 to include
in the utility model (1). For this we do 100 bootstrap runs with each metric.
In Figure 4 we plot the resulting log-likelihood with its standard error. We
see that the
√
driving distance sec provides the best prediction on average.
We also see that including the sibling status would improve the prediction
accuracy, however the statistical significance of the coefficient is low (Table 8)
in any combination of features. So we select the model (1) from Table 8 as our
final model.
For policy comparison we generate the ranking over all Kindergartens. We
do not model the cut-off levels for outside options, when the family would
rather keep the child at home. We assume they would always rather have a
place in any of Harku’s Kindergartens.
To obtain a full ranking of Kindergartens we use the probabilities from (2).
For counter-factual preferences we vary the coefficient for distance. The
parameter values are in (3). For each combination of parameters we generate
several (7) different preference profiles and evaluate the policies on the average
over all the preference profiles.
β1 ∈ {0.0,0.05,0.1,0.23,0.25,0.5,1,2,4,10} (3)
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Figure 4: Predictive features
Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 2(1), 2017
“p˙03” — 2018/1/16 — 12:42 — page 93 — #37
Andre´ Veski, Pe´ter Biro´, Kaire Po˜der, Triin Lauri 93
Table 8: Rank-ordered logit coefficients
preference rank
(1) (2) (3)
αB −0.690∗∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ −0.560∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.150) (0.143)
αC −0.565∗∗∗ −0.540∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.176) (0.145)
αD 0.157 0.185 1.479∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.182) (0.154)
αE 0.476∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.159) (0.146)
αF 0.275 0.351∗ 1.608∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.181) (0.153)
αG −1.769∗∗∗ −1.789∗∗∗ −1.580∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.195) (0.179)
β1 −0.229∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗√
driving distance sec (0.015) (0.015)
β2 20.750 20.812
sibling (2,676.852) (1,651.629)
Observations 906 906 906
Log Likelihood −882.862 −840.256 −958.955
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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To better interpret the results we look at the results by conditional proba-
bilities of a parameter set. We look at two conditional effects: (a) probability
of ranking Kindergarten higher given it is closer and (b)probability of rank-
ing a Kindergarten higher given a Kindergarten has a sibling. Formally the
conditional probability are defined in (4) and (5).
Pr(r1 < r2 | d1 < d2) = Pr(d1 < d2,r1 < r2)Pr(d1 < d2) (4)
Pr(r1 < r2 | s1 > s2) = Pr(s1 > s2,r1 < r2)Pr(s1 > s2) (5)
The mean conditional probability with fitted regression parameter, β =
0.25, is Pr(r1 < r2 | d1 < d2) ≈ 0.79± 0.0210. This is similar to what we
observe in the 2016 data, where Pr(ri  r j | di < d j) = 0.81, i 6= j. Figure 5a
shows the relationship between the logistic parameters and the conditional
probabilities.
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Figure 5: Coefficients and conditional probabilities
10 1.96 standard deviations, 95% probability
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B. ALLOCATED PREFERENCES
Table 9: Year 2016 allocated preference comparison DA
Policy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
Harku 115 14 6 3 4 8 2
IA 1 122 8 2 5 8 3 4
DA 1 110 17 3 6 6 9 1
DA 2 (M)a
98.75
(0.61)
19.95
(0.61)
9.65
(0.49)
11.05
(0.78)
7.20
(0.43)
4.85
(0.36)
1.22
(0.15)
DA 2 (S)
108.05
(0.61)
19.90
(0.56)
4.65
(0.41)
4.95
(0.39)
7.70
(0.37)
5.85
(0.36)
1.20
(0.11)
DA 3 (M)
98.30
(0.79)
21.95
(1.09)
8.85
(0.6)
9.9
(0.49)
8.35
(0.3)
3.75
(0.24)
1.5
(0.29)
DA 3 (S)
107.75
(0.38)
20.65
(0.38)
4.79
(0.50)
4.95
(0.29)
6.60
(0.39)
6.2
(0.3)
1.86
(0.25)
DA 4 (M)
89.25
(1.06)
27.2
(0.84)
13.1
(0.88)
9.85
(0.76)
7.7
(0.53)
4.35
(0.43)
1.38
(0.26)
DA 4 (S)
104.85
(0.70)
19.15
(0.70)
7.05
(0.63)
8.15
(0.6)
8.05
(0.46)
4.10
(0.28)
1.63
(0.26)
DA 5 110 17 3 6 6 9 1
DA 6 110 17 3 6 6 9 1
DA 7 (M)
107.6
(0.47)
15.85
(0.52)
5.7
(0.36)
8.9
(0.42)
6.95
(0.33)
5.9
(0.32)
1.47
(0.17)
DA 7 (S)
107.75
(0.47)
16.90
(0.44)
5.20
(0.26)
7.40
(0.36)
8.40
(0.37)
5.15
(0.33)
1.33
(0.14)
a For policies with lotteries in parenthesis are the standard errors
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Table 10: Year 2016 allocated preference comparison TTC
Policy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
Harku 115 14 6 3 4 8 2
IA 1 122 8 2 5 8 3 4
TTC 1 112 16 1 5 9 8 1
TTC 2 (M)
110.25
(0.52)
17.85
(0.49)
4.00
(0.32)
6.55
(0.41)
7.75
(0.45)
4.70
(0.52)
1.38
(0.21)
TTC 2 (S)
110.10
(0.45)
17.50
(0.56)
3.85
(0.33)
6.40
(0.56)
7.95
(0.36)
4.80
(0.35)
2.00
(0.23)
TTC 3 (M)
109.50
(0.54)
18.95
(0.72)
4.55
(0.34)
5.75
(0.37)
7.00
(0.40)
5.20
(0.28)
1.50
(0.25)
TTC 3 (S)
110.55
(0.61)
17.05
(0.51)
4.65
(0.36)
6.20
(0.52)
7.05
(0.39)
5.75
(0.35)
1.25
(0.13)
TTC 4 (M)
109.25
(0.56)
18.65
(0.74)
3.78
(0.33)
7.40
(0.62)
8.80
(0.57)
3.60
(0.36)
1.80
(0.29)
TTC 4 (S)
109.35
(0.38)
18.75
(0.48)
4.47
(0.42)
7.30
(0.37)
7.45
(0.45)
4.05
(0.25)
1.31
(0.17)
TTC 7 (M)
109.40
(0.39)
15.45
(0.37)
3.75
(0.28)
7.45
(0.39)
8.55
(0.36)
5.70
(0.25)
1.89
(0.23)
TTC 7 (S)
109.25
(0.41)
16.00
(0.45)
3.63
(0.34)
7.25
(0.37)
9.15
(0.33)
5.60
(0.29)
1.53
(0.12)
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C. MAP OF THE MUNICIPALITY
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Figure 6: Locations of children and Kindergartens (with walk-zones) in 2016
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D. RESULTS WITH TOP TRADING CYCLES (TTC)
Table 11: Year 2016 comparison of policies using reported preferences
Policy
Mean
prefer-
ence
First
Mean
distance
(km)
With
siblings
Frac.
children
with
JEa
BP per
child
with JE
DA 1 1.76 110 4.26 100 %
DA 2 (M)b
1.85
(0.01)
98.75
(0.61)
4.59
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 2 (S)
1.72
(0.01)
108.05
(0.61)
4.44
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 3 (M)
1.83
(0.01)
98.30
(0.79)
4.51
(0.02)
95 %
(0.25 %)
DA 3 (S)
1.72
(0.01)
107.75
(0.38)
4.45
(0.02)
96 %
(0.3 %)
DA 4 (M)
1.91
(0.01)
89.25
(1.06)
4.53
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 4 (S)
1.75
(0.01)
104.85
(0.7)
4.49
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 7 (M)
1.78
(0.01)
107.60
(0.47)
4.30
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
DA 7 (S)
1.76
(0.01)
107.75
(0.47)
4.31
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
a JE - Justified Envy, BP - Blocking Pairs
b For policies with lotteries, (M) indicates multiple tie-breaking lotteries and (S) single. The
standard errors over lotteries are in parentheses.
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Table 12: Year 2016 comparison of policies using reported preferences
Policy
Mean
prefer-
ence
First
Mean
distance
(km)
With
siblings
Frac.
children
with
JEa
BP per
child
with JE
TTC 1 1.76 112 4.39 100 % 11 % 1.06
TTC 2 (S)
1.71
(0.01)
110.1
(0.45)
4.49
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
9 %
(1.28 %)
1.08
(0.03)
TTC 2 (M)
1.69
(0.01)
110.25
(0.52)
4.51
(0.03)
100 %
(0.0 %)
21 %
(0.82 %)
2.16
(0.03)
TTC 3 (S)
1.7
(0.01)
110.55
(0.61)
4.47
(0.02)
96 %
(0.37 %)
14 %
(1.24 %)
1.27
(0.06)
TTC 3 (M)
1.69
(0.01)
109.5
(0.54)
4.46
(0.02)
95 %
(0.33 %)
22 %
(0.71 %)
2.16
(0.04)
TTC 4 (S)
1.69
(0.01)
109.35
(0.38)
4.6
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
20 %
(1.08 %)
1.86
(0.05)
TTC 4 (M)
1.7
(0.01)
109.25
(0.56)
4.58
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
26 %
(0.52 %)
2.26
(0.04)
TTC 7 (S)
1.77
(0.01)
109.25
(0.41)
4.48
(0.01)
100 %
(0.0 %)
22 %
(0.82 %)
1.70
(0.06)
TTC 7 (M)
1.78
(0.01)
109.4
(0.39)
4.51
(0.02)
100 %
(0.0 %)
23 %
(0.83 %)
1.90
(0.07)
a JE - Justified Envy, BP - Blocking Pairs
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Figure 7: Conditional probability of distance (TTC)
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Figure 8: Average distance and conditional probability of distance in prefer-
ences (TTC)
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Figure 9: Fairness of access
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Figure 10: Justified envy and blocking pairs (TTC)
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